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WHO'S AFRAID OF HENRY HART?
Michael Wells*
No law book has enjoyed greater acclaim from distinguished
commentators over a sustained period than has Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System.! Indeed, the
praise seems to escalate from one edition to the next. Reviewing
the first edition, published forty-three years ago, Philip Kurland
called it "the definitive text on the subject of federal jurisdiction."z Paul Mishkin added that "the analysis is of an order difficult to match anywhere."3 In his review of the second edition,
published in 1973,4 Henry Monaghan began by praising the first
for having "deservedly achieved a reputation that is extraordinary among casebooks," and then continued: "[M]y view is that
the second edition is at nearly every material point better than its
predecessor."s When the third edition appeared in 1988,6 Akhil
Amar called the first edition "beautiful and brilliant," and
thought the third "better in many respects."? No doubt similar
encomia will greet the recently published fourth edition.s Certainly the research is as thorough, the analysis as trenchant, and
the questions as probing as ever. Hart & Wechsler continues to
set the standard that other books must aspire to meet.
Yet technical virtuosity and comparative merit are not the
only tests by which a casebook may be judged. At the risk of
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia. The author wishes to thank Ann Althouse, Tom Eaton, Ron Ellington, Barry Friedman, Dan Meltzer, Richard Nagareda,
Tom Rowe, David Seipp, and Larry Yackle for their helpful comments on a draft.
1. Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal
System (Foundation Press, 1953).
2. Philip B. Kurland, Book Review, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 906, 907 (1954).
3. Paul J. Mishkin, Book Review, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 776, 778 (1954).
4. Paul M. Bator, et al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1973).
5. Henry P. Monaghan, Book Review, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 889, 889-90 (1974).
6. Paul M. Bator, et al., Han & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 1988).
7. Akhil Amar, Law Story, Book Review of Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts
and the Federal System, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 688,688 (1989). Amar appears to be less enthusiastic about the second edition. See id. at 710-11.
8. Richard H. Fallon, Daniel J. Meltzer, & David L. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler's
The Federal Courts and the Federal System (Foundation Press, 4th ed. 1996) ("Hart &
Wechsler Fourth").
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losing my union card in the Federal Courts workshop, I propose
to show that the editors, through all four editions, are fundamentally misguided in their approach to Federal Courts law. The
main criteria for the selection and treatment of materials is a
model of Federal Courts law elaborated by Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler forty years ago, in the first edition, and called by
one of the current editors the "Hart & Wechsler Paradigm. "9
The editors' premise is that a casebook should follow the
Supreme Court's treatment of the doctrinal problems, asking
questions about such matters as the adequacy of the Court's explanations, the implications of the Court's reasoning for the future, and consistency among the cases. According to the Court,
and Hart & Wechsler, Federal Courts law is mainly an effort to
achieve such worthy aims as striving for finality, for efficiency in
litigation, and for uniformity in federal law, assigning cases on
the basis of institutional competence, minimizing friction between federal and state courts, and avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions. For the sake of convenience in exposition, I
refer to this set of goals as "jurisdictional policy."
Jurisdictional policy does help to explain and justify Federal
Courts law, but it does not deserve the status Hart & Wechsler
accords it. Focusing their attention on jurisdictional policy, the
editors fail to develop the substantive themes that animate much
of Federal Courts law. The Supreme Court and, less often, Congress regularly set jurisdictional policy aside and employ Federal
Courts law as a means of favoring one side or the other on the
merits of the underlying litigation. For example, over the past
two decades the Court has transformed federal habeas corpus by
steadily chipping away at access to federal courts for state prisoners seeking to challenge their confinement on constitutional
grounds.w While jurisdictional policies of promoting finality and
respect for state procedures may help account for the Court's
habeas cases, the Court's general substantive stand against broad
constitutional rights of criminal procedure very likely influences
these decisions as well. Though Hart & Wechsler mentions the
political context of contemporary habeas law, the book contains
not so much as a single note explicitly exploring the substantive
theme, contenting itself with questions about the strength and
9. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 Vand.
L. Rev. 953, 955-57 (1994); id. at 960 (noting that "the book retains an unmistakable
continuity").
10. See, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2331,
2355-2416 (1993); Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 Hastings L.J. 939 (1991).
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implications of the jurisdictional policies advanced in the
opinions.11
Hart & Wechsler's neglect of substantive aims produces a
distorted picture of what the Supreme Court and Congress do in
Federal Courts cases, and why they do it. In addition, shunting
aside substantive themes hampers any examination of the normative question of whether and how much substance ought to count
for in Federal Courts law. The very success of the book exacerbates the problem. As one of the current editors puts it, Hart &
Wechsler "defined the field as we now know it" and exercises
"pervasive influence on Federal Courts teaching and scholarship. "tz Other case books seek to imitate it, generally (according
to casebook sales agents) by offering a "more teachable" version
of Hart & Wechsler.13 Scholars accept its premises as the foundation for their projects, often producing work that is not as incisive
as it could be, simply because they do not grapple with all of the
matters at stake in the cases.
This article questions the methodology Hart & Wechsler, and
Federal Courts scholars who follow its lead, use in addressing
Federal Courts issues. Part I lays out the Hart & Wechsler model
of Federal Courts law. Part II distinguishes naked substance from
jurisdictional policy and traces the impact of substantive themes
on jurisdictional doctrine. Part III finds fault with the fourth edition's treatment of substance. Part IV explains why these themes
are given little systematic attention by this and other casebooks.
Part V argues that the editors are wrong to deemphasize them.
I.

HART & WECHSLER'S FEDERAL COURTS LAW

The worth and influence of a casebook depend largely on
how much thought goes into the selection of materials. Anyone
can gather cases bearing on a topic and assemble them in a
bound volume. What is hard and valuable is to understand the
area well enough to grasp its underlying structure. In this way a
talented editor may abstract away from the mass of data and
identify general normative and descriptive propositions that successfully represent the doctrine and its underpinnings. The great
strength of Hart & Wechsler is the sophisticated model of Federal
11. See Hart & Wechsler Founh at 1373-1443 (cited in note 8). The discussion of the
political context in which the Court has made habeas law, see, e.g., id. at 1360-61, is not
the same thing as "substance," as I use the term. See text at notes 48-49, 84, 94.
12. Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 956 (cited in note 9).
13. The plainest example is Peter W. Low and John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Federal
Couns and the Law of Federal-State Relations (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 1994).
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Courts law that underlies the materials. Richard Fallon, one of
the editors of the fourth edition, calls the model the "Hart &
Wechsler paradigm." The paradigm is never stated explicitly in
the book itself, but is embedded in the choice of materials and
the commentary on them. In describing it, I rely upon Fallon's
article on the topic.
As Fallon points out, the Hart & Wechsler paradigm is based
on the theory of adjudication developed in the other great work
Henry Hart produced in the 1950s, The Legal Process,l4 co-authored with Albert Sacks.ls Some parts of the paradigm are
Legal Process methodological precepts that apply to judicial decision making in general, whether the issue comes from Federal
Courts, property, workers' compensation, or any other area.
These include, for example, the "anti-positivist principle" that
law should be conceived as "a rich, fluid, and evolving set of
norms ... not as a positivist system of fixed and determinate
rules,"I6 and "the principle of reasoned elaboration," that "the
judicial role ... is limited to the reasoned elaboration of principles and policies that are ultimately traceable to more democratically legitimate decisionmakers."I7 I have examined these parts
of the Hart & Wechsler paradigm in earlier articles.1s
Here I wish to take up the feature of the paradigm that
bears most directly on Federal Courts law. This is the proposition
that "questions of how decision-making authority should be allocated are of foremost importance."I9 Accordingly, The Federal
Courts and the Federal System defined the field of Federal Courts
in terms of allocations of authority among the branches of the
national government and between the national and state govemments.zo The reason these questions of institutional design are so
important lies in a proposition Hart and Sacks called "the principle of institutional settlement. "21

14. Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making
and Application of Law (Foundation Press, W. Eskridge and P. Frickey, eds. 1994).
15. See Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 957-58, 961, 964-66 (cited in note 9).
16. ld. at 965.
17. ld. at 966.
18. See Michael Wells, Busting the Hart & Wechsler Paradigm, 11 Const. Comm. 557
(1995); Michael Wells, Positivism and Anti-Positivism in Federal Courts Law, 29 Ga. L.
Rev. 655 (1995).
19. Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 964 (cited in note 9).
20. ld. at 956.
21. The materials were widely distributed, but remained unpublished until recently.
Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process (cited in note 14).
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INSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT

The principle of institutional settlement "expresses a judgment that decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly
established procedures ... ought to be accepted as binding on
the whole society unless and until they are duly changed. "22 It
would be a mistake to suppose that Hart and Sacks are merely
stating the truism that we should obey the law. Dismissing institutional settlement in this way would seriously underappreciate
its significance for Federal Courts law. Hart and Sacks call institutional settlement "the central idea of law," explaining that any
society must provide for procedures to settle disputes about the
content and application of law, whatever the substantive law may
be.23 In a small society, the constitutive arrangements may be as
simple as a single ruler or a council of elders, but "in a complex
modern society, the questions demanding settlement are too numerous" for such a solution. Moreover, in allocating these questions among governmental institutions, it is useful to keep in
mind the varying competencies of courts, agencies, and legislatures, for "different procedures and personnel invariably prove
to be appropriate for deciding different kinds of questions,"24
and the arrangements will vary from one society to another.
Though institutional settlement has received little explicit attention in Federal Courts scholarship, it is the central organizing
principle of The Federal Courts and the Federal System.2s Fallon
correctly points out that "it comes close to defining the Federal
Courts field all by itself. "26 In our system of government, the
powers to settle disputes are distributed among institutions by
means of federalism, which divides decision-making among the
national and state governments, and the separation of powers,
which splits up the power of the national government among the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches.21 In order to work
out the implications of the principle of institutional settlement in
our system, we must ask questions about the institutional competence of courts compared with other branches of government,
and of state versus federal courts, with the aim of seeing to it
"that the principle of institutional settlement operates not merely
22. ld. at 4.
23. ld.
24. ld.
25. See Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 962, 964, 967 (cited in note 9).
26. ld. at 967.
27. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum.
L. Rev. 489, 490 (1954) (federalism and separation of powers are means of dividing up
governmental power among a variety of institutions).
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as a principle of necessity but as a principle of justice. "zs This
task defines the scope of Federal Courts law, as conceived by
Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler,29 and their successors down
through the years have remained faithful to their conception of
the area, even as they depart from the doctrinal positions staked
out by the book's original editors.
B.

JuRISDICTIONAL PoLICIES

Institutional settlement not only defines the field of Federal
Courts for Hart & Wechsler; it also generates the framework of
jurisdictional policies within which those issues should be resolved. For the sake of drawing the distinction, crucial to my argument, between jurisdictional policy and substance, it will be
useful to describe briefly some of the major jurisdictional policies
that guide the decision of Federal Courts cases under the Hart &
Wechsler paradigm. Keep in mind that this is not a hornbook
summary of black letter law. Some of these propositions are
quite controversial, even among scholars who claim to share the
Hart & Wechsler mantle.
1. Institutional competence is a major consideration
throughout the field. For example, in determining whether a
given litigant has standing to raise an issue, courts following the
Hart & Wechsler model ask whether the litigant has a sufficient
personal stake to assure the adverseness needed for a full airing
of the issues.3o If a dispute is brought to court before there is a
sufficiently concrete issue to permit effective adjudication, it will
be dismissed for lack of ripeness.31 Under the Pullman abstention doctrine, unsettled state law issues should be left for the
state courts, because only they may authoritatively resolve
them.32 In the same vein, the Supreme Court should not undertake to review state court decisions that rest on adequate and
independent state law grounds.33 Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins34 establishes that ordinary common law rules are
within the competence of state courts, so that federal courts may
not go their own way on such matters.
28. Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process at 6 (cited in note 14).
29. See Hart, 54 Colum. L. Rev. at 489-91 (cited in note 27) (describing the
problems of institutional settlement in our federal system).
30. E.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
31. E.g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
32. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
33. E.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935).
34. 304 u.s. 64, 78 (1938).
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2. One implication of institutional settlement, embodied in
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, is that once
an issue is decided by fair procedures, the outcome is entitled to
respect by other courts. In a dual judicial system like our own,
this means that the courts of one sovereign should not reconsider
issues resolved by another, or hear causes of action that could
have been raised in the earlier proceeding,3s even if the case
raises federal constitutional issues.36
3. Litigants are expected to raise issues in accordance with
the valid procedures of the court in which they find themselves.
In order to enforce respect for those procedures, litigants who
fail to do so will be precluded from raising them later on
Supreme Court review of state judgments37 or in habeas corpus
proceedings in federal district court.3s
4. The problem of friction between federal and state courts
arises when the litigants struggle over which system will decide
an issue, as where one party brings suit in state court and the
other then attempts to secure federal jurisdiction. The problem is
dealt with by a general rule, set forth in the Anti-Injunction Act,
that federal courts generally may not interfere with pending state
cases,39 and by judge-made rules addressing contexts in which the
statute does not apply.4o
5. In the system of institutional settlement, courts are generally subordinate to Congress. This relationship is reflected in
Article Ill of the Constitution, which gives Congress power over
the creation and (by implication) the jurisdiction of federal
courts.41
35. Full Faith and Credit, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1989).
36. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. Of Education, 465 U.S. 75 (1984);
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
37. Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969). Editors of Hart & Wechsler have
disagreed among themselves over how strict the procedural default rule should be. See
Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 576-77 (cited in note 8).
38. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
39. 28 u.s.c. § 2283 (1990).
40. E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
41. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). The proposition in the text is contested by some scholars working within the Hart & Wechsler tradition. See, e.g., Akhil
Reed Arnar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article Ill: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205 (1985); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal
Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article Ill, 132 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 741 (1984). The founders themselves quarreled over whether Congress possesses untrarnrnelled power to restrict the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Cornpare Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1364-65 (1953) (no) with Herbert
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colurn. L. Rev. 1001, 1005-06 (1965) (yes).
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6. Our system of institutional settlement, however, is not
one of absolute legislative supremacy. Since Marbury v.
Madison,4z judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative
and executive action has been a part of it. There are at least two
important implications of this principle for federal courts law.
Congress may not evade judicial review by cutting off access to
all courts for federal constitutional issues.43 The principle of finality is also limited by due process. If a state procedure does not
provide a full and fair opportunity to raise federal issues, then
litigants should have access to federal court to assert them.44
7. Of course, it is better to avoid friction than to seek it
out. Sometimes, courts will have to confront the majoritarian
branches by deciding constitutional issues. But courts should, if
possible, strive to resolve the case at hand on other grounds. Accordingly, federal courts should, if possible, resolve cases on nonconstitutional grounds. One justification for narrow review of
state judgments, and for the standing, ripeness, and mootness
doctrines, is that absent a pressing need to resolve a constitutional issue, federal courts should decline to do so.4s
8. It is implicit in the principle of institutional settlement
that issues of federal law should be settled, and settled in the
same way everywhere. The utilitarian justification for uniformity
of national law is easy to appreciate, for a body of law cannot
effectively realize its aims unless it speaks with one voice
everywhere.46
9. Another uncontroversial goal of the practice of institutional settlement is achieving greater efficiency in the system of
dispute resolution, through doctrines like supplemental jurisdiction,47 which avoids piecemeal litigation, and the well-pleaded
complaint rule, which normally yields a quick and unambiguous

42. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
43. Cf. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (interpreting arguably ambiguous
statute as permitting access in order to avoid the "serious constitutional question" that
would arise if it were construed otherwise).
44. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 605,626 (1981); Michael G. Collins, The Right to Avoid Trial: Justifying Federal Court Intervention into Ongoing State Court Proceedings, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 49
(1987).
45. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341, 346 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussing techniques for avoiding constitutional issues).
46. E.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983).
47. Supplemental Jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1996). See also United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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answer to the question of whether a case is within the federal
question jurisdiction.4s
II.

SUBSTANTIVE THEMES IN FEDERAL
COURTS LAW

By the terms "substantive themes," "naked politics," and
their variants, I mean to distinguish between the jurisdictional
policies adumbrated above, on the one hand, and jurisdictional
decisions motivated by a preference that one side or the other
prevail on the merits of the litigation or gain a tactical advantage
that may prove decisive in close cases. This is not at all the case
when Federal Courts doctrines are based on jurisdictional policy.
Though Federal Courts issues always arise in the course of litigation over substantive rights and duties, the central characteristic
of jurisdictional policies is that they are not aimed at giving one
side or the other an advantage in the litigation. Policies like uniformity, finality, efficiency, institutional competence, and avoiding federal-state friction are trans-substantive, in that they apply
across the whole range of substantive issues. Their aim is to facilitate law making and dispute resolution in our complex system of
government, with its division of power between national and
state governments and among three branches of the national
government.
Some Federal Courts decisions and statutes, however, cannot plausibly be explained by jurisdictional policy alone. Consider the doctrine stemming from Younger v. Harris.49 Younger
itself merely holds that a federal court may not ordinarily enjoin
a pending state criminal prosecution, even where the state defendant/federal plaintiff raises a constitutional objection to the
state case.so It may be defended as an uncontroversial application
of the jurisdictional policy of avoiding friction between federal
and state courts. But the Court has extended Younger to cover
state civil and administrative proceedings, where the state interest is presumably weaker.s1 Moore v. Simssz obliges litigants to
remain in state court even where the federal issues are not defenses but permissive counterclaims. Again, the anti-friction pol48. E.g., Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). See also Han
& Wechsler Fourth at 910-11 (cited in note 8).
49. 401 u.s. 37 (1971).
50. Id. at 43-44.
51. See Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 1300-08 (cited in note 8).
52. 442 u.s. 415 (1979).
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icy seems weak here. In Hicks v. Mirandas3 the Court applied
Younger where the federal case was brought first, so that the policy of deference would seem to cut the other way. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. s4 can be read as requiring federal dismissal even
where it is impossible to raise the federal issue in the state case.
Fidelity to the jurisdictional policy of assuring access to the
courts to raise constitutional claims would call for upholding federal jurisdiction.ss
How, then, are these cases to be explained? The Court that
crafted the Younger doctrine is noted for the general theme of
pruning the growth of constitutional rights that flowered in the
1960s. The effect of the Younger doctrine is to direct federal constitutional claims to state courts. State courts are less likely to
favor the constitutional claimant in close cases than are the federal courts, for reasons that will be explained shortly. Though the
Supreme Court does not acknowledge it, the weakness of the jurisdictional policy arguments for cases like Hicks, Doran, and
Moore suggest that the extension of Younger beyond its narrow
holding is motivated largely by the Court's preference that the
state get the advantage of a sympathetic forum in close constitutional cases.
As the Younger doctrine illustrates, the main avenue for
manipulating jurisdictional doctrine toward substantive ends lies
in the selection of rules for allocating cases between federal and
state courts.s6 Federal and state courts are not fungible. They differ for a variety of reasons, including the judges' backgrounds,
"psychological set," and methods of selection. Perhaps most important, Article III guarantees federal judges life tenure during
good behavior, while many state judges must stand for election.
Subject to majoritarian pressure, state courts tend to give more
respect than do federal courts to the state's arguments in consti53. 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975) (holding that the federal court must defer so long as the
state prosecution is brought before there have been "proceedings of substance on the
merits" in federal court).
54. 422 U.S. 922, 929-31 (1975) (holding that federal litigants who are not being
prosecuted in state court may obtain preliminary injunctive relief in federal court, but
that a litigant who is being prosecuted in state court may not obtain interim relief, even
though the state court Jacks jurisdiction to grant such relief).
55. See Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for
Prospecti11e Relief, 1977 S. Ct. Rev. 193, 238.
56. Other opportunities for manipulating jurisdictional doctrines toward substantive
ends arise in connection with standing, Supreme Court review, the Eleventh Amendment,
and federal common law. See Michael Wells, The Impact of Substantille Interests on the
Law of Federal Courts, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 499, 504-10,520-40 (1989); Michael Wells,
Rhetoric and Reality in the Law of Federal Courts: Professor Fallon's Faulty Premise, 6
Const. Comm. 367, 378-80 (1989).
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tutional cases.s7 The outcome of a close case, where there are
open issues of law or difficult issues of fact,ss may turn on
whether the case is assigned to state or federal court.s9 The substantive impact of allocation decisions could not be proven decisively without controlled tests in which the same disputes are
litigated in both fora. Yet the behavior of lawyers seems to validate it. A glance at the federal and state case reporters will show
that, given a choice, lawyers for persons with constitutional
claims by and large prefer federal court.60 It is an open secret
that lawyers make arguments based on jurisdictional policy when
their real motive is to acquire a litigating edge.61 Nor could any
judge fail to appreciate the substantive consequences of jurisdictional decisions.62
In short, there is "weak parity" between federal and state
courts. By weak parity, I mean that state courts are sufficiently
well-informed and well-intentioned to give claims of federal right
a fair hearing, so that a litigant could not plausibly claim in the
ordinary case that he was denied due process by state court adju57. Cf. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the
Rule of Law, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 689, 726-29 (1995) (arguing that, for this reason, elective
judiciaries are constitutionally dubious).
58. My premise here is that the legal materials do not yield answers to these close
cases where the allocation decision matters and yet each forum is constitutionally adequate. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Playing By the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of
Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 34-37, 188-96 (Oxford U. Press, 1991);
Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law 352 (M. Knight trans., U. of California Press, 1967);
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 121-23 (Clarendon Press, 1961). Ronald Dworkin has
argued that, in a sense, every case has a right answer. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously 81-130 (Duckworth & Co., 1977). Dworkin seems to agree, however, that it may
be impossible to demonstrate with any confidence that one or another answer is right. See
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire viii-ix (Belknap Press, 1986).
Suppose Dworkin is correct in maintaining that there is a right answer to the substantive issue, in that a judge of Herculean talent could find one. Perhaps one court is more
likely to get to that right answer than the other. Even so, this possibility cannot provide a
persuasive ground for preferring one court over the other. In these hard cases we do not
know what the right answer is or how to arrive at it. The legal materials necessarily contain no criteria by which to evaluate a court's claim that its allocation decision is really
based on getting at the right answer. Accepting the "right answer" argument would effectively foreclose any criticism that an allocation decision improperly rests on substantive
grounds. For these reasons, I find it unacceptably facile to answer the charge that naked
substance lies behind an allocation rule by claiming that the rule is really based on a
presumption as to which court is more likely to arrive at the right answer.
59. See generally Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977).
Cf. Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. Legal Stud. 257, 281
(1995) (empirical study of federal judges, showing that in close cases, but not the mass of
cases, outcomes vary according to judicial background).
60. See Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Ton
Litigation, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 641, 655 n.72 (1987).
61. See Neuborne, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1115-16 (cited in note 59).
62. See Wells, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 505-10 (cited in note 56).
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dication. At the same time, state courts are not interchangeable
with federal courts.63 In these circumstances, the opportunity is
present for naked politics to influence jurisdictional decisions.64
When it is not unfair to send a case to state court, the principle of
assuring due process does not compel federal jurisdiction. Yet
both sides have a strong incentive to argue for what may be described as the home court advantage. Knowing that their jurisdictional decisions may have substantive impact, judges will be
tempted to take this into account in making them. In very general terms, litigation over constitutional rights is a conflict between the substantive interests of persons seeking to limit state
regulation of their activities, on the one hand, and the state's interest in pursuing its regulatory interests free of judicial interference, on the other. Judges who, in the main, favor constitutional
claims, will be inclined to favor broad access to federal court,
while judges whose substantive preferences lie with state interests in regulation may prefer to channel constitutional cases to
state court.
The Younger doctrine is not an isolated instance of raw substance influencing Federal Courts decisions. The significance of
naked politics may be appreciated by noting the global movements of Federal Courts law over the past forty years. Since the
first edition of Hart & Wechsler, Federal Courts law has undergone a revolution and a counter-revolution. Under Chief Justice
Earl Warren, the Court in the 1960s eased access to federal court
for federal constitutional claims. Monroe v. Pape6s reinvigorated
a ninety-year old civil rights statute, reading it as authorizing a
federal cause of action to redress virtually any constitutional violation committed by a state officer. Dombrowski v. Pfister66 loosened restrictions on federal injunctions against state proceedings.
The Pullman abstention doctrine fell into disuse,67 once again

63. See Burt Neubome, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence,
44 DePaul L. Rev. 797, 797 & n. 3 (1995); Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The
Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 609,
610-11 (1991).
64. See generally Wells, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (cited in note 56); Michael Wells, Is
Disparity a Problem?, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 283, 296-324 (1988).
65. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (federal suit to redress constitutional violations is appropriate even where the state provides a remedy).
66. 380 U.S. 479,489-92 (1965) (the state statute's overbreadth is sufficient justification for making an exception to the rule against federal equitable intervention to stop a
threatened state prosecution).
67. Han & Wechsler Fourth at 1237 (cited in note 8).
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strengthening access to federal court. In cases like Fay v. Noia68
and Townsend v. Sain69 the Court made federal habeas corpus
broadly available to persons convicted of crimes in state court.
Baker v. Carr7o and Flast v. Cohenn lowered the "standing to
sue" barrier to federal court access. The Eleventh Amendment's
prohibition on federal suits against states appeared to be
moribund. n
When the composition of the Court began to change, so did
the outcomes of Federal Courts issues. Dombrowski was eviscerated in Younger v. Harris,73 a case the Court then used as the
starting point for a sustained campaign of curbing access to federal court where a state forum was available to the federal plaintiff.74 Beginning with Wainwright v. Sykes7s the new Court
dismantled the Warren Court's habeas regime step by step.76 Allen v. Wright77 and Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State7B halted the Warren
Court's erosion of standing restrictions. Michigan v. Long79
boosted the conservative Court's power to review state court decisions expanding federal rights, while Pennhurst State School
68. 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) (federal habeas court may excuse a prisoner's procedural default in state court unless the default reflects a "deliberate bypass" of state
procedures).
69. 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963) (authorizing federal fact-finding hearings in habeas in a
broad array of circumstances).
70. 369 U.S. 186, 209-10 (1962) (permitting voters to challenge legislative districting
on the ground that disparities in the number of voters violate their rights to equal
protection).
71. 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968) (permitting taxpayers to challenge federal expenditure
on establishment clause grounds).
72. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (allowing monetary
recovery against a state government as part of equitable relief, without discussing the
Eleventh Amendment); Parden v. Terminal Railway, 3n U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (allowing
monetary recovery against a state government on an ill-defined waiver theory). See also
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670 (1974) (discussing Shapiro).
73. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
74. See Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 1291-1308 (cited in note 8).
75. 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977) (procedural defaults will be excused on habeas only on
a showing of "cause" and "prejudice"). An earlier case, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,48182 (1976) (no habeas for Fourth Amendment claims where the petitioner had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate them in state court), was a false start, having little impact
outside its narrow holding. See Hart & Wechsler Founh at 1389 (cited in note 8).
76. See text accompanying note 10.
77. 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (setting strict standards of "traceability" and "redressability" as barriers to standing).
78. 454 U.S. 464,479-80 (1982) (denying taxpayer standing to challenge decisions by
executive agencies).
79. 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (raising a presumption that ambiguous state court
decisions are based on federal law).
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and Hospital v. Haldermanso and Milliken v. Bradleys1 invoked
the Eleventh Amendment to hinder federal court reform of state
practices.
No doubt a detailed analysis of all of the strands of doctrine
at issue in these cases would show that each, standing alone,
could plausibly be justified in terms of jurisdictional policy.82 But
it is all too easy to miss the forest by looking solely at the trees.
When one considers the body of cases as a whole, it is evident
that the Court of the 1960s began from one set of premises, and
the Court of the past twenty-five years from another.s3 The key
variable is naked politics. The sole unifying theme throughout
the past forty years of Federal Courts developments is that, by
and large, the Court's jurisdictional program mirrored its substantive agenda.84 The Warren Court, favoring expansion of federal rights, sought to enhance their content not merely by rulings
on the merits, but by extending access to federal court for their
enforcement. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts tried to cut back
the content of federal rights, not just by rulings on the merits, but
also by precluding access to federal district courts and by extending its own power to review state decisions that may have
expanded federal rights.
Ann Althouse rightly warns against viewing Federal Courts
as a "stark picture of ideological Justices using jurisdiction as a
80. 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984) (the principle that federal courts may enjoin state officials does not extend to relief based on state law).
81. 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) (equitable relief may not be ordered against local government that did not commit a constitutional violation, even if such relief would be necessary to remedy the violation committed by another local government of the same state).
82. For example, the Warren Court habeas decisions were surely based, in part, on a
well-founded fear that state courts, especially in the South, would not provide a fair forum
for federal claims in the era of civil rights protests. See Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 1359-60
(cited in note 8); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally
Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State
Court Trial, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 793 (1965). Nor do I doubt that the recent cutbacks reflect
the current majority's respect for finality. But neither set of cases can satisfactorily be
explained solely in terms of jurisdictional policies. Liberal justices and scholars continue
to defend the Warren Court regime long after the premise of state court inadequacy has
lost its force. By the same token, the current Court's barriers go well beyond what is
needed to assure respect for finality. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., and Daniel J. Meltzer,
New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1796,
1816-20 (1991).
83. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 Va. L. Rev.
1141, 1142-43, 1151-1202, 1215-24 (1988).
84. See Wells, 6 Const. Comm. at 372-81 (cited in note 56). My article is a response
to Fallon's explanation that the tensions in the case law result from competing "structures
of thought" rather than "crudely political" conflict. Fallon, 74 Va. L. Rev. at 1147, 1149
(cited in note 83 ).
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smokescreen for a political agenda."ss In arguing that substance
accounts for many jurisdictional decisions, I do not mean to reduce the area to one in which naked politics decides every issue.
The influence of substance resembles a gravitational force that,
while invisible to the eye, pulls in one direction or another without necessarily controlling the outcome of a given dispute. It
must always compete with such formal considerations as the
value of following rules laid down in precedents or statutes,
though, as noted earlier, rule-based arguments tend to lack force
in Federal Courts law. A more serious competitor is jurisdictional
policy. The various jurisdictional policies may carry at least as
much weight as naked politics, especially in cases where the substantive implications of ruling one way or the other are slight or
uncertain.
For example, in some situations institutional competence
may favor the federal forum, even apart from concerns of basic
fairness, simply because federal judges are more talented than
state judges. As grounds for federal jurisdiction over federal tax
and patent cases, this argument has merit. When the issues are
constitutional questions bearing on civil rights and liberties, it
seems more of a makeweight. These cases require no specialized
knowledge; their intellectual challenges are within the grasp of
the average lawyer. Given the importance of value choices in
resolving hard constitutional questions,s6 partisans of federal jurisdiction are probably motivated more by a desire for a sympathetic forum than by considerations of competence.
Similarly, the policy of uniform federal law may favor federal courts. But the uniformity policy cannot plausibly justify
broad access to federal court for constitutional claims. When
Congress regards uniformity as important, it creates specialized
federal courts, or at least imposes exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Proponents of broad access to federal court in constitutional
cases do not advance either of these proposals and rarely if ever
rely on uniformity even as a makeweight. They typically seek to
give litigants a choice between federal and state court.

85. See Ann Althouse, Federal Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Federal Rights:
Can_ Congress Bring Back the Warren Era?, 20 L. & Social Inquiry 1067, 1075-79 (1995)
(reviewing Larry Yackle, Reclaiming the Federal Courts (1994)).
86. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1246-47 (1987).
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SUBSTANCE IN HART & WECHSLER

Fallon, Meltzer and Shapiro include many references to the
political settings in which Congress and the Supreme Court
render jurisdictional decisions.87 Even so, it seems to me that the
editors give substantive themes far less attention than they deserve. The paradox may be resolved by keeping in mind that
some jurisdictional policies have significant political overtones.
In particular, the goals of allocating jurisdiction on the basis of
institutional competence and assuring a fair forum often require
Congress or the Court to consider the political context.
The editors go wrong by failing to draw the crucial distinction between "naked politics"-i.e., basing jurisdictional law on
nothing more than a preference for the substantive interests of
one side or the other-and the effort to realize the Legal Process
aspirations of institutional competence and fair forums. These jurisdictional policies are discussed in the cases and in the notes,
while "naked politics" is rarely mentioned and never elaborated.
The effect, perhaps unintentional, may be to incline the trusting
reader toward (mis)understanding the relationship between politics and Federal Courts law exclusively in terms of jurisdictional
policy rather than raw substance. Alternatively, a suspicious
reader unschooled in the subtleties of the naked substance/jurisdictional policy distinction may too quickly dismiss the Court's
proffered reasons.
For example, the materials on procedural default suggest
that inadequate state ground cases from the civil rights era may
reflect "bend[ing] the jurisdictional rules to be able adequately to
deal with a pressing set of social, legal and political problems."BB
In the absence of some explicit discussion of naked politics as a
possible ground for those decisions, the reader will be illequipped to decide whether this is a reference to raw substance
or to the jurisdictional policy of assuring litigants a fair forum.
The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine relaxes standing requirements in free speech cases, but this is not necessarily ex87. In a letter commenting on a draft of this paper, Professor Meltzer told me that,
as he sees it, a partial list of such substantive themes would include issues addressed in
Han & Wechsler Fourth at pp. 35, 38, 74-76, 80, 85, 136-37, 139-40, 149-50, 172, 174, 20810, 265-69, 350, 351-54, 364, 452, 486, 536-38, 540, 542-43, 570, 576, 588 n.8, 604, 608-09,
625, 639, 654, 758, 841-43, 875, 901, 911, 1082, 1121-22, 1212, 1233, 1267, 1268, 1356-59,
1361, 1387, 1410, 1444, 1492, 1572-77, 1708, 1711, 1712-13, and 1713-14 (cited in note 8).
Letter from Daniel Meltzer to Michael Wells, Aug. 9, 1996 (on file with author).
88. Han & Wechsler Founh at 576-77 (cited in note 8). See also id. at 604 (on the
scope of Supreme Court review of facts found by state courts); id. at 1268 (noting that
Younger may be criticized for its failure to grant access to a "sympathetic" forum for the
assertion of federal claims).
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plained by naked politics. As the editors note, the conventional
Legal Process account of the doctrine is that free speech is an
especially fragile right requiring special solicitude.s9 The Court's
reluctance to recognize standing to obtain "structural" injunctions may be based on simple hostility to the substantive rights
advanced in the cases, but it is discussed in the cases in terms of
the Court's doubts about the institutional competence of federal
courts to manage such relief and whether those doubts are
justified.90
In each of these areas, it may well be that the better explanation of the Court's ruling is naked substance, unmoored from any
jurisdictional policy. My point is that there is little in the
casebook's treatment of doctrinal foundations that would invite
the reader to draw that conclusion. Conversely, a cynical reader
may jump to the unwarranted conclusion that naked substance
lies behind decisions that are actually justified in terms of jurisdictional policy. I believe, for example, that the civil rights-era
inadequate state ground cases can be defended in such terms. By
failing to distinguish between jurisdictional policy and raw politics, the editors miss an opportunity to improve the book. They
could have enhanced our understanding by focusing the reader's
attention on whether, and to what extent, contemporary Federal
Courts law can be adequately explained in terms of the Hart &
Wechsler paradigm and the jurisdictional policies that it
embraces.
There are, of course, exceptions to the book's general blurring of the line between substance and jurisdictional policy. For
example, the editors suggest that the liberal standing and ripeness rulings in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group9I may "most plausibly [be] explained" on raw substantive
grounds. Another example is the treatment of Michigan v.
Long,92 and the cases that came after it, where the editors do
89. Id. at 208-10. See also id. at 639 (on relaxing finality requirements in free speech
cases).
90. Id. at 265-70. See also id. at 1082 (Pennhurst may be motivated by the majority's
dislike of structural relief).
91. 438 U.S. 59, 72-82 (1978) (holding ripeness and standing requirements met for a
dispute in which the injury had no relation to the claimed constitutional violation). See
Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 150, 258 (cited in note 8).
92. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). This case expanded the Supreme Court's power to review
state judgments by holding that ambiguous state judgments would be presumed to rest on
federal grounds. As I have explained elsewhere, the effect of the ruling is to permit the
Court to review cases where the state court ruled in favor of the federal claimant. Hence,
it favors the substantive interests of the state over those of constitutional claimants. See
Wells, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 523-27 (cited in note 56). In later cases, where applying
the Long rule would have opened the federal courts to constitutional claimants, thus
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name substance as a likely culprit for the Court's selective enforcement of its holding. An intriguing question in the notes suggests a more systematic role for substance. The editors ask
whether the Court's practice may "illustrate a general principle:
jurisdictional rules tend to move in the direction of allowing
more intensive supervision in areas of the law where the
Supreme Court is in the process of changing the relevant substantive rules and wants to assure itself that the state courts are
complying with the new dispensation[.]"93 The editors direct critical fire at other cases from the Burger and Rehnquist eras, but
generally without openly suggesting that substance is the basis of
the rulings.94
Do these scattered references to substantive themes signal a
break with the book's traditional focus on institutional competence, avoiding friction, efficiency, uniformity, and the like?
There is still far too little explicit treatment of naked substance to
justify drawing that conclusion. These references, though promising, seem to me to be better characterized as deviations from the
jurisdictional policy norm that continues to dominate the selection and treatment of the materials, rather than as evidence of a
commitment to a methodical exploration of naked politics in
Federal Courts law. The current editors are, at best, equivocal in
their stance toward substantive themes.
Perhaps the best illustration of the editors' unwillingness to
grasp the nettle is their treatment of federal-state parity. Compared with its predecessors, and its current competitors, the
fourth edition makes some progress in exploring the parity problem.9s The editors survey the debate over whether there is disfavoring their substantive interests, the Court has not always remained faithful to that
rule. See Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 540-43 (cited in note 8).
93. Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 542-43 (cited in note 8). Other examples of substantive themes may include linking the "public rights model" of adjudication with "the substantive expansion of constitutional rights, especially under the Warren Court of the
1960s," id. at 80; and identifying the substantive basis of some of Congress's restrictions
on federal jurisdiction, id. at 364.
94. See, e.g., id. at 140-41, 147-48, 172, 268-69, 1082, 1295-96, 1297-98, 1308, 1411,
and 1440.
95. See Amar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 715-16 (cited in note 7). Reviewing the third
edition, Professor Amar noted that, though the third edition was better on parity than the
previous two, "even it fail[ed] to develop the issue with the degree of care and precision
that are the hallmarks of the book." I d. at 715.
As for competing casebooks, some of them contain very brief discussions of parity,
see, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Richard A. Matasar and Michael G. Collins, Federal Courts
829-30 (Little, Brown & Co., 1996); Low and Jeffries, Federal Courts and the Law of
Federal-State Relations at 210 (cited in note 13); Louise Weinberg, Federal Courts 277-78
(West, 1994); Martin H. Redish and Gene R. Nichol, Federal Courts 688 (West, 3d ed.
1994); Donald L. Doemberg and C. Keith Wingate, Federal Courts, Federalism and Sepa-
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parity between federal and state courts as an empirical question.
But they quickly pass over the topic, failing to identify "weak
parity" as an option, much less to address its substantive implications. As a result, they lack the means to provide complete explanations of doctrinal developments.
For example, they briefly contrast Warren Court habeas
corpus doctrine with the restrictive habeas decisions of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, pointing out that the latter "are seen
as having a different substantive agenda-one that embraces
greater reluctance to interfere with the state courts, and greater
faith in their quality."% In the absence of some discussion of
weak parity and naked substance, the reader is apt to conclude
that the difference between the earlier and later periods is solely
about jurisdictional policies of competence and fairness: The
Warren Court questioned the "quality" of state judges, while its
successors did not.
The editors cite an empirical study that purported to show
parity, and note criticisms of the study. But they do not explore
the matter in any depth and make no independent evaluation of
the issue, though the study itself seems to support weak parity
rather than fungibility.97 They cite newspaper stories from 1991
for the proposition that after years of Republican appointments
to the federal bench, some constitutional litigants began to prefer
state over federal court, but do not give any figures. They ignore
statistics showing a steady rise in federal civil rights filings
through the Bush administration.9s A survey of the advance
sheets would reveal that far greater numbers of constitutional litigants continue to prefer federal court. In any event, the newspaper stories cited in Hart & Wechsler Fourth are now somewhat
dated after several years of Clinton appointments. The overall
effect of the editors' treatment is to create the impression, unration of Powers 635 (West, 1994); but none of these treatments are as good as Hart &
Wechsler's. I can find no references to the parity issue in David P. Currie, Federal Courts
(West, 1990) or in Charles T. McCormick, James H. Chadbourn and Charles Alan Wright,
Federal Courts (Foundation Press, 9th ed. 1992).
The best account of the parity problem may be found in a brand new casebook, H.
Fink, et al., Federal Courts in the 21st Century 9-19 (Michie Law Publishers, 1996).
96. Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 1361 (cited in note 8); see also id. at 1410.
97. Id. at 351-53, citing Solimine and Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and
State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 Hastings Const. L.Q. 213 (1983)
(finding that federal courts upheld constitutional claims 41% of the time, as opposed to
32% for state courts). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role
for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 233, 261-69 (1988) (criticizing Solimine and
Walker).
98. See Theodore Eisenberg, Civil Rights Legislation 184-85 (Michie Co., 4th ed.
1996).
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warranted in my view, that there is room for doubt about the
empirical question of whether parity does or does not exist.
Much more space is devoted to "parity as a constitutional
concept," the name the editors give to the issue of whether Article III obliges Congress to provide a federal forum for review of
federal issues.99 This, of course, is a doctrinal problem that fits
neatly within the Hart & Wechsler terms of discourse. However
it should be answered, one examines the legal materials and reasons from them to a resolution. The editors are plainly more
comfortable dealing with this kind of problem than with the realworld parity issue.
HOW SUBSTANCE UNDERMINES THE HART &
WECHSLER PARADIGM
Why is substance given such short shrift in Hart & Wechsler?
The editors do not say.1oo The answer cannot be that they are
blind to its presence, for in their scholarship Professors Fallon
and Meltzer recognize that substance influences Federal Courts
doctrine.101 Perhaps the editors think naked politics warrants little attention because it is of minor importance in explaining Federal Courts law. If substance influenced only an occasional case,
it would have little impact on the utility of the Hart & Wechsler
paradigm. No model explains everything; even theories of the
physical world do not account for every observation. The social
world is more unruly. Courts do err, and the "naked politics"
cases could be understood as deviations from the norm. One
point of a model, after all, is to provide a framework for analysis
that will help identify the errors.
This explanation for minimizing substance does not suffice.
Over the past forty years, substance has dominated the major
movements in Federal Courts doctrine, first in the Warren
IV.

99. See Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 353-54, 373-79 (cited in note 8).
100. The decision is all the more puzzling in that elsewhere Fallon has claimed that
substance is fully compatible with the Hart & Wechsler paradigm. See Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Comparing Federal Courts "Paradigms," 12 Const. Comm. 3, 6-7 (1995). But it is unclear whether he means "naked" substance, as I define that term. See text at notes 47-48.
As I argue in the paragraphs below, Fallon is mistaken if he thinks that naked substance
can be reconciled with Hart & Wechsler.
101. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction: The Limits of Models, 66 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 2507, 2511 n. 20 (1993) ("I do not doubt that people who seek to restrict
habeas jurisdiction generally prefer more limited constitutional protections-or that,
more generally, federalism arguments often mask substantive ends. [But substance should
not necessarily be determinative.)"); Fallon, 12 Const. Comm. at 6 (cited in note 100)
(asserting that "[n]o sensible partisan of the Hart & Wechsler paradigm thinks that 'jurisdictional policy' could be as innocent of substantive concerns as [Wells) maintains that the
paradigm demands").
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Court's expansions of access to federal court, and then in the
conservative reaction that followed and continues to the present.
Substantive themes cannot be dismissed as aberrations from the
norm. Naked politics exercises decisive influence in decisions on
standing, the Younger doctrine, habeas corpus, Supreme Court
review of state judgments, and the Eleventh Amendment.toz
A more likely explanation for the editors' equivocal stance
toward naked substance is that recognizing a prominent role for
substance in the casebook would undermine the whole enterprise
of constructing Federal Courts law on Legal Process principles.
Showing why this is so begins with an examination of the foundations of Hart & Wechsler, which lie in the principle of institutional settlement. In a sense, it is merely a boring necessity that
some institution of government must lay down binding decrees
on legal issues. But institutional settlement has a normative dimension as well as a descriptive one, and it is the normative aspect that Hart and Sacks emphasized at the outset of The Legal
Process. Decisions reached by established procedures "ought to
be accepted as binding."W3 They should be accepted because the
alternative to these "regularized and peaceable means of decision" is "disintegrating resort to violence."t04 Since we must live
together under conditions of interdependence if we are to satisfy
our wants, we are all better off living in peace.tos
Why do Hart and Sacks stress the value of institutional settlement so heavily? The Legal Process was a response to Holmes
and the Realist scholars of the early twentieth century, who
showed that judges often do not mechanically deduce results
from pre-existing legal rules, but exercise judgment to resolve issues to which the legal materials offer no clear answer.106 The
Realist critique suggested that law making may be nothing more
than the outcome of a struggle between conflicting interests, unconstrained by any transcendent standards of justice or fairness.
It became an urgent priority among legal theorists to come up
with a response to nihilism that could withstand intellectual scru102. See Wells, 71 B.U. L. Rev. at 640-41 (cited in note 63); Wells, 30 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. at 519-40 (cited in note 56).
103. Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process at 4 (cited in note 14) (emphasis added).
104. ld.
105. See id. at 1-2.
106. See, e.g., Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
"Hu~ch" in Judicial Decision, 14 Cornell L.Q. 274 (1929). See also Laura Kalman, Legal
Realtsm at Yale, 1927-1960 at 223 (U. of North Carolina Press, 1986); G. Edward White,
The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59
Va. L. Rev. 279, 280-91 (1973).
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tiny.1o1 In addition, the Realist critique cast doubt on the legitimacy of judicial law making. Judges lack the imprimatur of
election to a policy-making post, and now they were deprived of
the pretense that they merely deduced results from the extant
rules. How, if at all, could judicial creativity be justified?los
After World War II, a number of scholars, including Henry
Hart, Albert Sacks, and Herbert Wechsler, undertook to meet
the challenges posed by Realism. Herein lies the genesis of The
Legal Process, and the jurisprudential movement that we know
by the name of the book. According to Legal Process scholars,
the Realists were right in their claims that legal rules are indeterminate and that judges make law on the basis of social policy.
But the Realists were wrong to think that judges merely impose
their own policy preferences. Moreover, Legal Process scholars
maintained that Realism does not imply nihilism. Accepting the
Realist critique of formalism does not mean endorsing the view
that law making is merely a matter of deciding whose selfish interests will prevail.
Institutional settlement is Hart & Sacks's primary response
to the threat of nihilism posed by the Realists' debunking of formalism.lo9 They explain its importance in the most basic terms: If
people are to achieve their aims in life, they must live together
"under conditions of interdependence."no In order to do so, they
"must obviously have a set of understandings or arrangements of
some kind about the terms upon which they_ are doing so."111
Their "substantive understandings," about proper conduct, "necessarily imply the existence of what may be called constitutive or
107. See Neil Duxbury, The Reinvention of American Legal Realism, 12 Legal Stud.
137, 154 (1992).
108. See Bruce Ackerman, Law and the Modern Mind by Jerome Frank, 103 Daedalus 119, 123 (1974); Amar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 693-94 (cited in note 7).
109. Along with the principle of institutional settlement, Hart and Sacks maintained
that judges are constrained in a variety of other ways from simply imposing their wills.
According to The Legal Process, judges do not decide cases based on hunches or their
personal preferences. Though legal rules do not and cannot cover every issue that may
arise, the legal materials available to judges include not only rules but also "principles and
policies" that "are used and useful as guides to the exercise of a trained and responsible
discretion." Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process at 143 (cited in note 14). Adjudication
consists in the reasoned elaboration of the whole body of legal materials, including rules,
principles, and policies, to the resolution of the issue at hand. In statutory cases, judges
are not put to a choice between reading the statute literally and doing with it what they
please. Rather, they should and do strive to discern the purposes of the legislation and to
implement them. See William Eskridge and Philip Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process at xci-xcvi (cited in
note 14).
110. Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process at 3 (cited in note 14).
111. Id.
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procedural understandings or arrangements about how questions
in connection with arrangements of both types are to be settled. "uz These arrangements, which determine which institutions
are to settle particular questions, "are obviously more fundamental than the substantive arrangements ... since they are at once
the source of the substantive arrangements and the indispensable
means of making them work effectively."113
For Hart and his colleagues, the legal process, with institutional settlement at its base, saves us from nihilism. Debates over
substantive issues may well pit the narrow interests of one group
against another. Even so, the process of making and applying law
is not a morally empty realm in which the strong or devious prevail and the weak and innocent must submit. The legal process
has a moral value of its own, independent of substantive outcomes.l14 Decisions by courts and legislatures deserve general respect, even from the losers, because they are the product of
"regularized and peaceable means of decision" rather than resort
to naked force. Just as the alternative to setting up legal institutions and legal process is "disintegrating resort to violence," so
also "defiance of institutional settlements touches on or may
touch the very foundations of civil order, and ... without civil
order, morality and justice in anybody's view of them are
impossible. "11s
The normative value of institutional settlement has an important corollary: An institutional system may be more or less
worthy of our respect. Though we should accept the outcomes of
duly authorized procedures "unless and until they are duly
changed,"u6 we are not obliged to accept blindly just any system
of institutional settlement. Rather, "[t]he lawyer's business in any
given institutional system is to help in seeing that the principle of
institutional settlement operates not merely as a principle of necessity but as a principle of justice."u7 It is plain from the context
that Hart and Sacks mean that the institutional system should
aspire to operate as a principle of procedural justice. Our aim
should be the "constant improvement" of our procedures "in the
effort to assure that they yield decisions which are not merely
112. Id.
113. Id. at 3-4.
114. See Paul A. Freund, Henry M. Hart, Jr.: In Memorium, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1595,
15% (1969) (Hart "saw the integrity and fitness of the legal process as a kind of transcendent natural law, a law above laws, ... reminding us that there is indeed a morality of
morality").
115. Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process at 109 (cited in note 14).
116. Id. at 4.
117. Id. at 6.
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preferable to the chaos of no decision but are calculated as well
as may be affirmatively to advance the larger purposes of the
society. "us
For the jurisdictional system to make a plausible claim to
general allegiance, it must be constructed as though we were behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance.u9 If we are to give due regard
to everyone's substantive preferences, the procedural system
must not favor any set of substantive outcomes. Once inadequate
or unfair procedures are eliminated, substance should play no
role in allocating jurisdiction, though of course the ultimate end
is to achieve the best set of substantive outcomes in a "long term
and aggregate sense. "12o
Understanding the normative dimension of institutional settlement enables us to make important and subtle distinctions between ostensibly similar rationales for federal jurisdiction. Take
the difference between sympathy and fairness. Under Hart's
model the inadequacy or unfairness of a state forum is a valid
basis for access to federal court, while the greater likelihood that
a federal judge will look kindly upon federal claims is not. Sympathy is an euphemism for giving the plaintiff a substantive advantage, and institutional settlement cannot be "a principle of
justice" if substance is permitted to influence the procedures for
deciding substantive issues. The whole point of institutional settlement is to provide a disinterested means for settling substantive disputes, such that, whatever our views of substantive rights
and duties, we can fairly be asked to accept the substantive outcomes the system produces. As Fallon puts it,
118. Id.
119. Cf. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 136-42 (Harvard U. Press, 1971) (maintaining
that persons would reach a just social contract if they were deprived of information about
"how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged to
evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations"). According to Rawls,
"[t]he veil of ignorance makes possible a unanimous choice of a particular conception of
justice." Id. at 140. Unanimity is important, because "[i]t enables us to say of the preferred conception of justice that it represents a genuine reconciliation of interests." Id. at
142.
I do not mean to conscript Rawls onto Hart's team. His topic is political philosophy,
not federal jurisdiction. The differences may be important. All the same, I do think that
the analogy is an apt one.
120. Fallon, 12 Const. Comm. at 7-8 (cited in note 100). In this attenuated sense,
"substance" does have a role in Federal Courts law under the Hart & Wechsler paradigm.
Hart and Sacks's utilitarian view of the goals of the legal system sets as the ultimate aim
of jurisdictional law, and of all law, the creation of the body of substantive law that will
best permit human beings to live the good life. At the same time, basing jurisdictional law
on naked politics is out of order. The point of Hart & Wechsler is that jurisdictional rules
should not be based on the substantive interests of the parties, but on jurisdictional policies that will guide us toward an effective system of law making and dispute resolution.
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In a post-Realist world, legal norms are frequently indeterminate. Moreover, in a demonstrably pluralistic society, we cannot expect consensus about appropriate answers to many
urgent questions of substantive justice. But most of us, Hart &
Wechsler assume, are prepared to accept the claim to legitimacy of thoughtful, unbiased decisions by government officials
who are reasonably empowered to make such decisions. On
this assumption rest our hopes for the rule of law.121
Deciding allocation issues on the basis of sympathy amounts to
allowing one side to the substantive dispute to gain an advantage
by imposing jurisdictional rules that favor its substantive interests, rigging the game as it were. In that event, the loser cannot
fairly be expected to accept the legitimacy of the outcome.122
Using substance to decide allocation issues undercuts the normative value of the principle of institutional settlement. Federal
Courts law can no longer serve as an answer to Realist-inspired
skepticism about the legitimacy of adjudication.
V.

WHY SUBSTANCE BELONGS IN FEDERAL
COURTS CASEBOOKS

Given the references to political context that do appear in
Hart & Wechsler Fourth, it may be a bit unfair to take Fallon,
Meltzer and Shapiro to task for their failure to pay more attention to naked substance. At the same time, there is something to
be said for holding the leading book in the field to a high standard. It is, after all, the example that others follow. In any event,
though I use the fourth edition as a convenient target, my main
aim is not to single it out for criticism, but to make a broader
point about the methodology of Federal Courts casebooks and
scholarship: At present, substance receives only rudimentary atFallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at %4 (cited in note 9).
This emphasis on designing legal institutions with the aim of achieving broad
agreement on the fairness, if not the content, of the outcomes they produce is a central
Legal Process theme. Besides the principle of institutional settlement, its influence may
be seen in Hart's critique of Supreme Court opinion writing for failure to reflect "(the]
life principle" that "reason is the life of the law and not just votes for your side," Henry
Hart, The Supreme Court 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv.
L. Rev. 84, 125 (1959); in Wechsler's caJI for constitutional decisions based on "grounds of
adequate neutrality and generality, tested not only by the instant application but by
others that the principles imply," H. Wechsler, Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law
21 (Harvard U. Press, 1%1); and in Lon Fuller's insistence that adjudication is an appropriate process only for "bipolar" disputes in which each of two contending parties advances arguments based on legal materials and the task of the judge, cast as a neutral
a:biter, is ~imply to choose between them rather than exercise broad discretion to impose
h1s own will, see Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev.
121.
122.

353, 365, 370-71, 394-95 (1978).
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tention from Federal Courts scholars, including, but by no means
limited to, Fallon, Meltzer and Shapiro. In my view, the tension
between institutional settlement and unadorned substance ought
to be a central theme of Federal Courts law, one that is examined
in the systematic and explicit way that is currently reserved for
doctrinal matters.
Whether to include substantive themes in the Federal Courts
casebook depends on a judgment of the costs and benefits of doing so. The first answer an editor is likely to give against putting
something in his casebook is that there is not room for it. But
that response would carry little weight here. In terms of space,
adding substance to the casebook is just a matter of including a
few extra questions and notes here and there. If the editors are
worried about space, I could suggest any number of topics that
might be omitted or abbreviated for the sake of including substance. For example, the twelve pages devoted to the distinction,
under pre-1988 law, between mandatory and discretionary
Supreme Court review of state judgmentst23 might be reduced,
since it is now "of merely historical interest."t24 Students need no
instruction in the substantive themes that affect Federal Courts
law, for most will have already taken Constitutional Law and
Criminal Procedure. Many will grasp the substantive themes
quickly; they are evident to anyone willing to look for them.
But including substance is costly in other ways. Since substance subverts the Hart & Wechsler project, putting it in the
book amounts to abandoning, or at least modifying, the Legal
Process's project of making Federal Courts law a bulwark against
nihilism. Bringing substance into the discussion of Federal Courts
doctrine in a systematic way would require the editors to sacrifice
the notion that Federal Courts law is strictly a body of trans-substantive law designed to mediate among conflicting political interests toward the end of maximizing the social good. If we value
Hart & Wechsler's aims highly enough, as the editors evidently
do, then perhaps it is best to continue to minimize the role of
substance in the book. But the value of those aims depends in
part on how likely they are to prevail in the real world. Fallon
understands that, for better or worse, Henry Hart's ideals no
longer have as much currency as they once did, at least not
outside the circle of Hart & Wechsler acolytes.12s However realis123. Han & Wechsler Founh at 644-56 (cited in note 8).
124. ld. at 644. Nor is it clear to me why the Nonhern Pipeline case gets 16 pages, id.
at 399-416, and Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n another eight, id. at 422-30, given
that the issues in the two cases are similar, though the results diverge.
125. Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 971 (cited in note 9).
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tic it may have been in 1953 to think that we could achieve consensus, it is plain today that ideological conflict is inescapable in
public law, at least for the time being.126 The instability in Federal Courts law over the past forty years shows that either side
will exploit the opportunities afforded by jurisdictional law to
promote its substantive agenda. Given that Hart's aspirations
probably will not be realized in any event, compromising them
may be a small price to pay for the greater realism that more
attention to substance would bring to Federal Courts casebooks.
Perhaps I am too skeptical about the chance that Legal Process aspirations can be realized. Because I share many Legal Process ideals, I would like to think that Hart's project can succeed,
at least partly, in spite of the beating it has taken in recent decades. But this cannot happen unless scholars and students take
seriously the normative issues underpinning Hart & Wechsler. At
present, they are not invited to do so. Federal Courts students
and scholars receive the unspoken message that the doctrine is
supposed to be aimed at a body of law based on jurisdictional
policy, a message that rests, in turn, on an implicit normative
judgment that it is wrong to base jurisdictional law on naked substance. They are evidently expected to accept this as a given, for
the book's fragmentary treatment of politics denies them the opportunity to debate the proposition that institutional settlement
is a more valuable goal than pursuing a substantive agenda by
jurisdictional means. In fact, the principle of institutional settlement is never mentioned in Hart & Wechsler.
Legal Process goals would be better served by bringing the
principle of institutional settlement into the casebook, noting the
conflict between it and the substantive themes that threaten it,
and presenting arguments on all sides. Instead of taking the value
of institutional settlement for granted, the leading casebook in
the field should question its own premises. This would entail a
basic shift in methodology. Rather than taking the principle of
institutional settlement as the premise of Federal Courts law, and
always attempting to solve jurisdictional issues by reference to
jurisdictional policy, scholars would have to eschew the whole effort to build Federal Courts law on a foundation. We need to
take a more pragmatic view of the area, acknowledging that jurisdictional policies may be overridden by raw politics, and un126. .see Eskridge and Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal
Process, m Hart & Sacks: The Legal Process at cxviii-cxxv (cited in note 14); Wells, 71
B.U. L. Rev. at 629-36 (etted in note 63).

202

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 14:175

derstanding that the value of institutional settlement may not
carry the day against a substantive agenda in a given context.
Suppose that substance is indeed an illegitimate ground for
allocation decisions. Nonetheless, it exerts palpable influence. Ignoring it is hardly the way to fight it. If the Legal Process project
is to be revived, students must be given a chance to appreciate its
value. When the normative issue is made explicit and students
are obliged to confront the choice between institutional settlement and substantive aims, they may leave the course with a better understanding of the value of institutional settlement and a
stronger commitment to it. If they do not, the battle is lost anyway. It is better to face that possibility than to shrink from it. By
declining to debate the normative foundations of Federal Courts
law, Hart & Wechsler's editors commit a distressingly familiar error. The strongest point Critical Legal Studies has made against
traditional scholarship is the failure of scholars in the Legal Process tradition to identify and defend their premises.121
Normative debate is needed not only on the threshold question of whether institutional settlement may be compromised in
favor of substantive themes, but also on narrower doctrinal questions. Take it as given that, right or wrong, the Supreme Court
long ago abandoned absolute fidelity to institutional settlement
in favor of using Federal Courts law to pursue a variety of substantive goals. A host of questions, left unaddressed in Hart &
Wechsler, arise: How is the value of institutional settlement to be
measured against substantive goals in a given context? Are some
jurisdictional policies strong enough to overcome substantive
aims, while others are not? Are some substantive aims stronger
than others? What contextual circumstances favor jurisdictional
policy and which favor substance?
For example, respect for the integrity of state enforcement
proceedings seems to be an especially important jurisdictional
policy, so that, as Paul Bator noted, "[i]t is ... not only not
surprising but ... virtually inevitable that" neither Congress nor
the Supreme Court has permitted removal of whole cases from
state to federal courts based on a federal defense, except in extraordinary circumstances.tzs Even prudent liberals agree.129 On
127. See G. Edward White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 Stan. L. Rev.
649, 661-70 (1984); Joseph Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 465, 518-19 (1988)
(reviewing Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927-1960 (1986)); Robert W. Gordon,
New Developments in Legal Theory, in The Politics of Law 414-16 (Pantheon Books, rev.
ed. 1990}.
128. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22
Wrn. & Mary L. Rev. 605, 611-12 (1981}.
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the other hand, avoidance of unnecessary constitutional decisions
evidently has little force in contemporary Federal Courts law.
Twice the Burger Court overrode the avoidance policy in order
to pursue substantive aims.13o As for the varying importance of
substantive rights, the Warren Court's expansion of habeas
corpus suggests that the Court considered sympathetic enforcement of constitutional rights of criminal procedure a sufficiently
strong substantive aim to overcome the finality policy. First
Amendment rights have often received especially solicitous
treatment in jurisdictional law. By contrast, the constitutional
rights of taxpayers get less respect.m Are these distinctions appropriate? In order to articulate questions like this, one must
step outside the Hart & Wechsler paradigm.
The case for including naked substance is equally strong
when it is put on descriptive grounds. Fallon notes that "the Hart
& Wechsler paradigm reflects an insider's largely internalized
standards of what is sayable and unsayable, relevant and irrelevant, persuasive and unpersuasive in legal argument about Federal Courts issues. "132 Substance should be minimized because
the "paradigm's principal function is not to predict outcomes, but
to suggest, invoke, and elucidate some of the norms that help to
constitute legal argument about Federal Courts issues." In addition, it "serves an important pedagogical function of imbuing students with some constitutive conventions of legal argument."t33
Since the Court does not deploy substantive arguments, they are
not among those norms and conventions, and need not be examined in a systematic way. Judging from the evidence offered
by the fourth edition, Fallon and his co-editors remain uncertain
as to just how much attention should be devoted to substance,
and are especially wary of exploring the subversive implications
of "weak parity."t34
129. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1569, 1631-32 (1990).
130. See Wells, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 520-27 (cited in note 56) (discussing Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman and Michigan v. Long).
131. Compare Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (recognizing taxpayer standing to
challenge Congressional expenditure on establishment clause grounds), and the Court's
special "willing[ness] to relax finality requirements in order to protect speech interests
against the erosion that can attend delay," Han & Wechsler Fourth at 639 (cited in note
8), with the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, and Fair Assessment in Real Estate
Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981), which bar litigants challenging state taxes
from federal district court so long as an adequate remedy is available in state court.
132. Fallon, 12 Const. Comm. at 10 (cited in note 100).
133. Id. at 12.
134. See text at notes 87-99.
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This justification for privileging jurisdictional policy over
substance is hardly compelling. Let us grant that one aim of a
casebook is to describe the norms and conventions of legal argument. A casebook, especially a casebook that defines the field
and sets the scholarly agenda, should do more than that. It ought
to portray the reality of what courts do. Since substantive themes
influence much of Federal Courts law, students should be taught
about that influence, and scholars should examine those themes.
A casebook should permit students and scholars not only to appreciate the internal logic of legal argument, but also to stand
outside the doctrine and appraise it free of commitments to the
Court's conventions. Students benefit from learning not only the
conventions of argument but also the real forces that lie behind
the Court's pieties. Scholars should explore those forces and
their implications rather than trying to analyze problems within a
model that is not fully adequate to the task,t3s
Fallon concedes that Hart & Wechsler is "by no means a
unique perspective," defending it nonetheless as "one view of the
cathedral," that is "capable of generating genuine insights."l36
But showing that the Hart & Wechsler paradigm has value is
hardly a sufficient defense of the editors' decision to continue to
build the casebook around it. Permit me to draw an analogy:
every navigator knows that geocentric astronomy has its uses
even after Copemicus.137 Yet its practitioners are not likely to
obtain appointments in modem astronomy departments. In deciding whether to adopt Legal Process principles as their framework, the editors of the leading casebook in the field ought not
to content themselves with a model that yields "genuine insights." They should ask whether they could do better. If a different framework would generate a more sophisticated
135. I concede that neither side to a dispute about Federal Courts issues is likely to
find it useful to publicly advance unadorned arguments based on substance. Nor are
judges, whatever their politics, likely to invoke substance in support of their positions on
Federal Courts issues. This, in itself, is an interesting feature of Federal Courts discourse.
The general rejection of such arguments may reflect the normative allure of institutional
settlement. The reason why neither side considers naked politics to be a congenial argument is that we all prefer to present ourselves to the world as persons who pursue the
public good, and arguments based on litigation advantage and the like cast some doubt on
that image. See Wells, 29 Ga. L. Rev. at 283-86 (cited in note 18). Casting their arguments in terms of jurisdictional policy, while pursuing substantive ends, allows the disputants to avoid choosing between the two, and hence to have their cake and eat it, too, so
to speak.
136. Fallon, 12 Canst. Comm. at 12 (cited in note 100).
137. See Thomas Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution; Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought 38, 58 (Harvard U. Press, 1957).
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understanding and a more penetrating analysis, it ought to be
preferred.
So far as I can tell, Fallon and his co-editors have not undertaken any such inquiry. In my view, a fair comparison of an approach that includes substance against the Hart & Wechsler
approach would favor the former as an explanatory tool. Recall,
for example, the earlier discussion of the turbulence of modern
Federal Courts law. Nothing in the realm of jurisdictional policy
can fully account for the Warren Court's jurisdictional revolution
in habeas corpus, standing, and access to federal injunctive relief.
Nor can jurisdictional policy by itself provide a plausible reason
for the Rehnquist Court's assault on the habeas regime and the
growth of the Younger doctrine. If it is true, as Fallon asserts, that
Legal Process scholars "are quite adept at predicting judicial outcomes,"I3s the reason is that, for all their obeisance to the Legal
Process catechism, they fully grasp the lessons of Realism.
While including substance in the casebook would compromise some Legal Process ideals, it would serve another idealthat of candor. A tenet of the Legal Process is that candor is a
requisite of legitimacy in adjudication. According to David Shapiro, "candor is the sine qua non of all other restraints on abuse
of judicial power," since "judges who regard themselves as free
to distort or misstate the reasons for their actions can avoid the
sanctions of criticism and condemnation that honest disclosure of
their motivation may entail. "139 Given the ubiquity of substance
in Federal Courts law, the Supreme Court should be called to
account for it. One function of legal scholarship is "sustained,
disinterested, and competent criticism of the professional quality
of the Court's opinions."I4o ·Attention to substantive themes by
the leading casebook in the field would be an effective way of
calling the Court's attention to the need for more candor about
naked politics in Federal Courts law. Excluding substance not
only shortchanges students, but also gives the Court a free
ride.I41
Besides concealing some of the reasons for its decisions, the
Supreme Court's lack of candor, and Hart & Wechsler's passive
138. Fallon, 12 Const. Comm. at 12 (cited in note 100).
139. David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 731, 737
(1987).
140. Hart, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 125 (cited in note 122).
141. On this point I may be at odds with Ann Althouse, who is "afraid that open
acknowledgement of the political nature of jurisdictional choices will have the unwanted
consequence of undermining the legitimacy of any judicial rights-enforcing agenda." Althouse, 20 L. & Social Inquiry at 1081 (cited in note 85). I doubt whether the legitimacy
Althouse seeks is attainable in the absence of candor.
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complicity in it, has unfortunate implications for modem Federal
Courts scholarship. Since Hart & Wechsler dominates the field,
scholars view it as the only game in town, and feel constrained to
make their arguments in the vocabulary of the paradigm. Yet
many contemporary Federal Courts scholars object to the
Court's rulings on grounds that are more correctly characterized
as substantive. They respond to this dilemma in diverse ways,
none of which is satisfactory. Fallon, for example, vainly tries to
expand the paradigm in a way that would subvert its purpose,
insisting that the Hart & Wechsler canon permits the allocation
of cases to federal courts because they are more likely to sympathize with federal claims.142 Erwin Chemerinsky tries to justify
access to federal court in terms of litigant choice, without making
a judgment on parity.143 Having constrained himself in this way,
he cannot adequately explain why the preference of the party
seeking federal access ought to prevail over that of his adversary.144 Martin Redish145 and Akhil Amar146 try to escape the
Hart & Wechsler trap by resort to formal arguments based on
Article III and section 1983. Their efforts, too, fall short, mainly
because formal arguments generally lack persuasive force in Federal Courts law.147 In each case the critique would pack more
punch if it were straightforwardly framed in substantive terms.148
142. See Fallon, 12 Const. Comm. at 7 (cited in note 100), where Fallon lumps together fairness and sympathy: "Can contemporary federal courts implement section 1983
without weighing the extent to which state courts and agencies are likely to provide fair
and sympathetic fora for the vindication of federal rights? Although others might disagree, I do not think so." As noted earlier, confiating the two is a mistake, because fairness is a jurisdictional policy within the Hart & Wechsler paradigm, while sympathy is an
euphemism for naked politics. See text at notes 120-22.
143. See Chemerinsky, 36 UCLA L. Rev. at 236-37 (cited in note 97).
144. See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory:
A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 329, 33942 (1988). See also Richard A. Matasar, Treatise Writing and Federal Jurisdiction Scholarship: Does Doctrine Matter When Law Is Politics?, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1499, 1505-07, 151618 (1991) (reviewing E. Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction (1989)) (regretting Chemerinsky's reluctance to engage in normative debate of the political issues at stake in Federal
Courts cases).
145. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of
the Judicial Function, 94 Yale L.J. 71 (1984).
146. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the
Two Tzers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205 (1985).
147. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (1985);
Daniel Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1569 (1990);
Michael L. Wells and Edward J. Larson, Original Intent and Article III, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 75
(1995).
148. For an example of the sort of argument I find more illuminating, see Larry W.
Yackle, Reclaiming the Federal Courts (Harvard U. Press, 1994) (analyzing Federal Courts
problems from an avowedly liberal substantive perspective). In recommending the book,
I do not mean to endorse Yackle's proposals for law reform. In my view, jurisdictional
policy deserves more respect than Yackle gives it when, for example, he recommends that

1997]

WHO'S AFRAID OF HART?

207

CONCLUSION
One might be forgiven for wondering if the decision by Fallon, Meltzer and Shapiro to stick with the Hart & Wechsler paradigm could withstand a dispassionate evaluation of its advantages
and demerits. I suspect that one reason the editors remain faithful to Hart & Wechsler is simple (and admirable) loyalty to great
men who made immense contributions to the field. Another may
be intellectual conservatism of the sort that kept the Ptolemaic
astronomers in business for many decades after Copernicus:I49 so
long as the book remains the leader in the field, neither the editors nor the publisher see any compelling reason to change it.
Decades of inbreeding among the Federal Courts elite may contribute to the problem. Nearly everything that Federal Courts
scholars learn about the area comes from Henry Hart, Herbert
Wechsler, and their students.1so Their reluctance to admit troubling ideas into the canon may be explained in terms of their socialization into the ways of the tribe. Theorists of the sociology of
knowledge teach that people trained in the values and beliefs of
a group tend to take these to be true, ignoring, marginalizing, or
rationalizing anything to the contrary.1s1 Finally, the very nobility
of the Hart & Wechsler pedigree is itself an obstacle to change. A
danger of working within a great tradition is that the editors, and
Federal Courts scholars who follow their lead, may have invested
too much intellectual capital in its success. Complacency may
have set in, and with it a reluctance to challenge ways of thinking
to which they have become accustomed.

the well-pleaded complaint rule be abandoned, id. at 100-04, 114; that defendants in state
civil cases be permitted to remove the litigation to federal court based on a federal defense or counterclaim, id. at 116-18; and that the Younger doctrine be abolished for facial
challenges to state statutes, id. at 144-48.
I would like to see similar treatments of Federal Courts law written from a conservative perspective. My aim is to change (and, I hope, reinvigorate) the terms of the debate
over federal jurisdiction rather than to promote one or another doctrinal regime.
149. Kuhn, Copernican Revolution at 224 (cited in note 137).
150. See Amar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 691-93 (cited in note 7).
151. See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality
129-55 (Doubleday,1966). Cf. Kuhn, Copernican Revolution at 135 (cited in note 137) (on
the "band-wagon effect" among scientists).

